# The landscape of payments fraud: Trends, Threats and Prevention

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## Payments System Improvement

#### Overview of Role and Purpose

- Federal Reserve Financial Services (FRFS) Vision: Deliver a contemporary and trusted payment system that works for everyone
- Payments System Improvement Mission: To facilitate material, end-to-end advances in the U.S. payment system that promote integrity, efficiency, and accessibility




Collaboration with the Payments Industry



## Fraud Landscape Loss Summary (2023)





Nasdaq Verafin - 2024 Global Financial Crime Report





iC3 – Loss Report

#### Top Scam Losses

- Investment Related \$4.5B
- 2 Imposter \$2.7B
- Business/Job Opportunities \$491M

Federal Trade Commission - Report Fraud Data



## Fraud Landscape Summary

Biggest challenges include both "old" and "new" forms of fraud attacks





Check Fraud
Account Takeover





Scams
Synthetic Identities
Money Mules
New Account Fraud

Future Concerning
Threats



**GenAl Deep Fakes Scripted Attacks** 



# Check Fraud and Account Takeover



## Rise of Historic Threat: Check Fraud

Check Usage Falling; Check Fraud Rising<sup>2</sup>



Over **10 billion** checks processed in 2023<sup>1</sup>



Check usage down but average check amounts **increase**<sup>1</sup>

Check fraud loss reached



Sources: <sup>1</sup>Federal Reserve Payment Systems Check Services Report; <sup>2</sup>FinCEN SAR Stats; <sup>3</sup>Nasdaq 2024 Global Financial Crime Report



## Rise of Historic Threat: Check Fraud

Why Does Check Fraud Continue to be an Issue?

Scams and Money Mules





Mail Theft /
High Volume in
Circulation








## Rise of Historic Threat: Check Fraud

Key Focus Areas for Check Fraud Prevention

**People** 



**Processes** 



**Technology** 





## Rise of Historic Threat: Account Takeover

~\$13B in losses

15% increase







Phishing, Smishing, and Vishing



Default/simple passwords



"Credential Stuffing" / brute force attacks



**Insiders** 

Sources: <sup>1</sup>Javelin 2024 Identity Fraud Study; Datos Insights



## Rise of Historic Threat: Account Takeover

What Else Do Bad Actors Do with ATO?




Source: Javelin 2024 Identity Fraud Study



## Scams





## **Evolving Threat: Scams**

Scams Occur Across Multiple Products & Channels



Federal Trade Commission - Report Fraud Data



## **Evolving Threat: Scams**

Many Factors Contribute to Significant Scam Growth



Data Breaches
Increased Availability
of Personally Identifiable
Information (PII)



Shift to Digital Channels



Technology Advances



**Convenience of Digital Transactions** 



Emotional Vulnerabilities



## **Evolving Threat: Scams**

How Do We Slow Down the Fraudsters?



Education



Fraud Information Sharing



Technology



#### SCAMS – ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

## Scams Definition & Classification Work Group



#### Challenge

- Multiple operational definitions of scams
- Lack of necessary detail in existing classification approaches

#### Response

- Align on an industry-recommended operational scam definition
- Build a classification structure that is detailed enough to document scam nuances and tactics

#### **Industry Value**

- A shared understanding of the term "scam" and the different scam types
- **✓** More consistent scam reporting
- Insights to help improve mitigation

Work group participants are listed on FedPaymentsImprovement.org



#### SCAM CLASSIFIER

The ScamClassifer<sup>SM</sup> model supports consistent and detailed classification, reporting, analysis and identification of trends in scams. It uses a series of questions to differentiate and classify scams by categories and types, and provides a view of the full impact of scams by including cases that resulted in authorized payments, as well as unauthorized payments from account access. The model also can be used to capture attempted scams.

#### **SCAM DEFINITION:** the use of deception AUTHORIZED SCAM CATEGORY: or manipulation PAYMENT: Products or Services intended to Authorized party achieve financial made a payment Buying or selling gain products or services Merchandise Investment STEP 1: STEP 2: STEP 3: STEP 4: Property Sale or Rental **CONFIRM SCAM** CONFIRM AUTHORIZED OR **IDENTIFY THE** SELECT THE Romance Impostor UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT SCAM CATEGORY SCAM TYPE Does the case - YES $\rightarrow$ How was the Select the scam What action Government Impostor resulted from appear to authorized party type based on the meet the scam the scam? deceived or deception used Bank Impostor definition? manipulated? **Business Impostor** Relative/Family/Friend Someone posing as a business, organization, Other Trusted Party vendor, agency or other UNAUTHORIZED trusted party PAYMENT: "ScamClassifier" is a service mark of the Federal Reserve Banks. A list of marks Refer to FraudClassifier **Authorized Party** related to financial services products that are offered to financial institutions by to determine payment SCAM CATEGORY: the Federal Reserve Banks is available at FRBservices.org. enabled unauthorized fraud classification. Relationship and Trust account access

# Fraud Information Sharing



#### SCAMS - ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

### Information Sharing Can Help Mitigate Fraud Losses



Consumer Awareness of Current Fraud Trends Reduces Victimization



Broader Access to Fraud Information Helps Train Fraud Models to Proactively Identify Suspicious Transactions



Sharing of Information Across Industries Can Help Mitigate Fraud Across Organizations



#### SCAMS - ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

# Recent Industry Developments Create a Favorable Environment to Advance Information Sharing Efforts



**New Technologies** 



Shift Toward Consumer Consent Sharing and Open Banking











#### SCAMS – ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

## Scams Information Sharing Work Group



#### Challenge

- Fraudsters repeat the same tactics across organizations
- Can be challenging to identify effective, timely mitigation approaches
- Information sharing is incomplete, leading to fragmented approaches and sharing models

#### Response

- Develop recommendations for fraud information sharing approaches
- Will consider data types, methods and benefits of information sharing

#### **Industry Value**

- Stronger management of scams
- **▼** Faster reaction to fraud trends
- Enhanced industry awareness

Work group participants are listed on FedPaymentsImprovement.org



# Fraud Landscape



## Potential Impacts to the Fraud Landscape



Global Regulatory and Policy Frameworks



Safety Expectations



Contributory
Information Sharing
& Data Analytics



Convenience Needs




## Future Concerning Threats

GenAl Deep Fakes & Scripted Attacks



Generative Al Deep Fakes



Scripted Attacks and Bots



# Fraud Mitigation



#### SCAMS - ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM

### What Are Others Doing to Help Mitigate Scam Activity?



What types of fraud trends are you seeing?



How have you educated customers?



Which mitigation strategies have been successful?



Do you offer guidance to customers after they have been victimized?



## Get Connected. Stay Engaged.

